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ABSTRACT 
 
We apply the target revenue model, a version of prospect theory, to investigate how 
fishermen adjust their trip length to changes in daily revenue. The key finding is that certain 
groups of fishermen seem more likely to behave according to the target revenue model rather 
than the standard model of labor supply. Asian American captains seem more likely to 
behave according to the target revenue model than Caucasian captains. We also find that 
vessel capacity has little effect on whether the captains seek target revenue. The study 
strongly supports the integration of prospect theory into the framework of labor supply 
analysis. 
 
Key Words: Behavioral economics in fisheries; Hawaii Longline; Prospect Theory; Target 
revenue model. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Fishing effort, as measured by the number of fishing days for a given trip, is probably one of 
the most important decisions for any fisherman.  Studies on fishing effort have been widely 
published.  To the best of our knowledge, most of these studies1 use the standard assumptions 
of economic theory, namely that economic agents are rational and self-interested. In this 
paper, we explore the fishermen’s decision-making behavior on the number of fishing days 
per trip by applying an alternative framework using the target revenue model.  We will see 
how having a target revenue may influence the fishermen’s decision regarding trip length and 
how this may result in a different prediction from the standard economic model regarding the 
relationship between daily fishing revenue and the number of fishing days. To investigate 
which model provides a more reasonable description of reality, we observe the empirical 
evidence from the Hawaii-based longline fisheries.  
There are factors that make fisheries an interesting case study. First, anthological and 
anecdotal evidence seem to suggest that fishermen may exhibit income targeting behavior 
(Holland, 2008; Lynham, Siegel and Costello, 2007). However, there has been no empirical 
study to investigate this evidence. Second, fishermen face capacity constraints for fuel and 
food supplies. These constraints may result in shortening the trip despite not having achieved 
the target revenue goal for a given trip as predicted by the target revenue model.  Third, 
Hawaii longline fisheries consists of owners from different ethnic groups, each one 
potentially behaving differently in the decision-making process. Accordingly, certain groups 
of owners may be more likely to behave in accordance with the standard economic model; 
                                                 
1 Few studies e.g., Holland  & Sutinen (2000),  and Holland (2008) consider irrational aspects of fishermen’s 
making behavior. 
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whereas the others are more likely to behave according to the target revenue model. Finally, 
Hawaii’s longline fishermen generally vary in terms of fishing experience which allows for 
estimation of correlation between experience and observed behavior. 
As far as fishery management is concerned, the idea that the fishermen seek target 
revenue could have important policy implications. First, to achieve the target the fishermen 
may be willing to make risky and unsafe decisions. For instance, due to stormy conditions 
the vessel was having a bad trip, and as a result, it took longer for the vessel to achieve the 
target.  Thus, the captain may be willing to prolong the trip rather than return to port despite 
the storm. That decision would threaten the lives of the whole crew. Likewise, the fishermen 
may be willing to take the risk of being fined so they can fish in the restricted area in order to 
achieve the preset target. Along this line, Holland (2008) suggests that fishery management 
officials may consider two alternatives in establishing compliance strategies: policy with 
high probability of detection and moderate fine or policy with low probability of detection 
and high fine.   
Another relevant aspect of revenue targeting to fishery management relates to a  popular 
policy experiment aiming at preventing further entry and rebuilding the stock once the 
fishing stock reaches a steady state. Given this scenario, Lynham, Siegel and  Costello 
(2007), using a simulation model, show that in a fishery, which includes both income 
maximizers and income targetters, incumbent fishermen wouldn’t be better off by closing the 
fishery and rebuilding the stock. Accordingly, fishermen rarely support such policy proposal.    
We proceed with the remainder of the paper as follows. In the next section, we are going 
to discuss literatures which have a special focus on the target revenue model in fisheries.  We 
then present a simple model of target revenue model in a fishery. Next, we are going to 
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investigate the following questions:  1. How well does the target revenue model describe the 
fishing behavior of Hawaii longline fishermen? (2) How do capacity constraints impact 
fishermen’s behavior under the target revenue model framework?  (3) How does ethnicity 
impact fishermen’s behavior under the target revenue model framework? We then conclude 
the paper in section 8.  
 
II. A LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
An Inter-temporal Model of Labor Supply in Fishery  
 
A great number of recent studies on labor supply have followed the inter-temporal 
formulation of the standard neoclassical model (Camerer et al., 1997; Chou, 2003; Farber, 
2005). The model predicts, under the standard framework, that there is a positive correlation 
between the number of working hours and wage rate.   
Studies on the supply of labor have empirically shown little support for the standard 
model’s prediction (Falk: 2004, 2006). Though most studies have found a positive correlation 
between labor wages and labor supply, the results are not significant.  This insignificant 
relationship found in the empirical studies can be attributed to a number of factors. For 
instance, in many settings workers are required to work a fixed number of hours per day 
regardless of their hourly wage (Falk, 2004).  Another question is whether changes in wages 
are temporary or permanent with respect to the time horizon of the decision-making 
framework.  Under the standard model of labor supply, decisions are made under a long-run 
or lifelong horizon.   
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Most empirical studies in fisheries, however, assume that decision making is short-
term (i.e., a fishing trip). This short-run time horizon, for example, certainly impacts on the 
standard model’s predictions of fishermen’s behavior (Eggert and Lokina, 2007).  In a 
seminal paper, to describe fishery captains’ labor supply behavior, Gautam, Strand, and 
Kirkley (1996) develop a model that highlights both contemporaneous and intertemporal 
trade-offs between labor and leisure. They then test the theory based on data from a sea-
scallop fishery. The key finding is that the short run labor supply exhibits backward bending 
property. More specifically, captains were found to increase time at sea and decrease time 
onshore in response to higher current-period profits per day. At sufficiently high levels of 
profits per day, captains reduce time at sea and increase time onshore. The findings suggest 
that labor supply is backward-bending in current daily profits whereas leisure demand is 
forward-falling. 
In the search for a model to bridge the gap between theoretical prediction and 
empirical evidence, increasing attention has been paid to the target revenue model which 
offers an alternative description of labor supply. In what follows, we will briefly review the 
labor supply studies based on the target revenue model.     
  
 Revenue Target Model: A Prospect Theory Based Model 
 
The seminal paper by Camerer et al. (1997) on the labor supply of taxi drivers in New York 
City is the first study on labor supply under the prospect theory framework. Camerer et al. 
find a negative elasticity for the taxi driver’s working hours with respect to hourly wage in 
the range of [-0.61, -0.18]. According to the authors, the negative relationship between the 
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number of working hours and average wage rate results from the fact that each taxi driver has 
a daily target income level.  On a given day, drivers continue driving until they achieve their 
target income levels.  On a productive day with many customers, it takes only a few hours to 
meet that target goal.  Conversely, on days with fewer customers, it takes more hours to 
reach that same target level.  
Following the Camerer et al. paper, a number of labor supply studies based on the 
target revenue model have been conducted. Using a similar approach, Chou (2002) finds that 
Singaporean cab drivers exhibit exactly the same decision making behavior on time 
allocation as those in New York City.  Fehr and Gotte (2007) provide an innovative method 
of labor supply study. They use a randomized field experiment to explore how bike 
messengers respond to changes in hourly wages.  They estimate the loss aversion parameters 
of the participants and find that messengers with strong loss aversion behaved in accordance 
with the target revenue model.  Conversely, messengers with less loss aversion appear to 
follow the standard model of labor supply, i.e., they increase effort levels in response to an 
increase in the piece rate.  
In support of the standard inter-temporal model, Farber (2005, 2008) conducts a study 
also on New York taxi drivers. Farber’s approach focuses on the probability of continuing to 
drive at any given time by asserting that the greater the number of accumulated driving 
hours, the lower the probability a driver continues to drive. He argues that the key factor in 
determining the cab driver’s daily driving hours is the number of hours driven. Farber finds a 
positive but not significant effect of cumulative earning on the probability of stopping 
driving. This finding is qualitatively consistent with the target income model.  Farber also 
finds a significant and positive impact of cumulative working hours on the probability of 
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stopping which gives support for the standard model of labor supply. 
The most recent study by Crawford and Meng (2008) offers a convincing reason for 
the validity of the target revenue model despite Farber’s finding. Based on the theoretical 
model developed by Koszegi and Rabin (2006), Crawford and Meng argue that as the 
workers work longer than the targeted hours they also experience loss as income is below the 
income target level. Crawford and Meng use the same set of data and apply the same 
structural model approach as that utilized by Farber. The important distinction is that they 
consider targets as the agent’s rational expectations rather than the latent variables as Farber 
does. More specifically, Crawford and Meng use the average of realized incomes and 
working hours as a proxy for the targets. Their main finding is that the probability of 
stopping work is determined by income when the realized income is higher than expected as 
supported by the Camerer et al. study. When the realized income is less than expected the 
probability is determined by the number of worked hours as shown by Farber. In either case 
the agents are likely to behave according to the target revenue model.      
 
Target revenue model in the context of fisheries 
How relevant is the target revenue model to fisheries? As discussed above, the target 
revenue model is drawn from a literature in which an individual (taxi driver) makes 
optimizing choices that are self-interested. The decision making process in a fisheries context 
is a bit more complicated. Most fishing vessels, including the longline fishery, employ three 
kinds of labor: owner, captain and crew. However, in the context of this study (Hawaii’s 
longline fishery) the decision on whether to continue fishing or return to port is made by the 
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owner and captain2. Like Gautam, Strand, and Kirkley (1996), we assume that to remain 
employed, captains make the same choices that owners would have made. Put differently, we 
can think of a vessel owner / captain as an individual decision maker just like a taxi driver. 
The main reason that allows fisheries to serve as an ideal application for the target 
revenue model is probably the short time horizon of the decision making process and the 
uncertainties surrounding each trip.  Decisions on the length of a fishing trip are made one 
trip at a time.  This short time horizon differs from the standard model’s assumption of using 
a lifelong horizon.  There is also a great deal of uncertainty surrounding each trip as it is 
possible that a vessel can have a highly profitable trip followed by a very unprofitable trip, 
and the reasons may be due to uncontrollable factors such as bad weather or poor fishing 
grounds.  Due to these reasons, it is not easy for a vessel operator to expect a certain return 
for each fishing trip and, thus, the operator also will not know how long each trip will last. A 
possible strategy for the vessel operator is to establish a target revenue goal. This goal acts as 
a reference point to help decide whether to continue the fishing trip or not.  
 From interviews with vessel operators in the Hawaii longline fisheries, we found that 
a majority of vessel operators have a mentally constructed target revenue goal for each 
fishing trip. The target revenue is typically the vessel’s average trip revenue realized in 
previous years.  For example, operators of average size longline vessels mentioned aiming 
for a revenue of $20,000 per trip. Once the operator has reached this goal, he would very 
likely conclude the trip and return home.  The probability of continuing the fishing trip after 
achieving $19,000 is much greater than continuing after receiving $21,000 of revenue. 
Psychologically, it is true that people are more likely to work harder prior to reaching a goal 
                                                 
2 Most crews in Hawaii based longline fishery are paid by a fixed wage regime. The owner is responsible for all 
the trip’s expenditures including food supply for the crew and captain. The captain’s wage usually accounts for 
40% to 50% of the net trip’s profit.  
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than after exceeding that goal (Fehr and Falk, 2002).  According to Goette et al. (2004), it is 
this type of decision-making behavior that makes the Kahneman–Tversky prospect theory a 
relevant framework in our study.  
There are also other features that makes fisheries an interesting case for the study of 
labor supply under the target revenue model.  First, fishermen have flexibility to choose their 
work schedules (Gautam, Strand, and Kirkley, 1996) which in turn allows for variability in 
the number of fishing days between trips and vessels. Variation in the number of fishing days 
makes it possible to use trip length as the dependent variable. Second, a typical feature of 
decision making in longline fishery is to consider each fishing trip in isolation.  If the vessel 
operator made decisions based on two trips as opposed to one, for instance, the additional 
revenue from one productive trip could offset the loss in the other unproductive trip.  In order 
to reach the revenue target for the two trips, the vessel operator may fish longer during the 
productive trip and shorter during the unproductive trip.  Despite having a revenue target (for 
the two trips together), the vessel operator’s behavior follows in suit with the inter-temporal 
model of labor supply.  
 
Other considerations 
   In general, the fishing trip length decision is complex due to a number of factors, 
including vessel capacity and auction fish prices. Vessel physical capacity determines the 
length of time that a vessel can fish. The ability to produce ice during a trip is crucial in 
lengthening the amount of time a vessel is out at sea.  Fish price, which is controlled by 
market supply and demand forces, can directly impact trip revenue and induce uncertainty 
regarding trip length. Fish prices are determined by a high level of competition at the local 
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United Fishing Agency fish auction and are also influenced by the number of fishing boats 
choosing to offload on a particular day.  Depending on the number of boats offloading to the 
fish auction, vessel operators may gamble by shortening a trip and catching fewer pieces of 
fish, and offloading on a day when fewer boats are at the auction in hopes of securing higher 
prices to compensate for the lower quantity in fish pieces. 
This paper greatly simplifies the complex process above by assuming that the vessel 
operator has a revenue target, as opposed to a target quantity of fish pieces caught. This 
assumption may cause one to ask how the vessel operator can estimate the accumulated 
revenue of the trip especially when the auction fish price fluctuates on a daily basis.  This is 
possible thanks to the constant communication between the captain who is monitoring the 
boat in the ocean and the owner who closely follows what happens at the auction.  Focusing 
solely on revenue rather than on fish prices will significantly simplify this complex price 
mechanism. Regarding the vessel’s physical constraint to stay longer in the ocean, we use ice 
maker and vessel size as a proxy for vessel capacity. Having an ice maker enables larger and 
typically shallow-set vessels to fish longer, as does being a larger vessel.  When fish are 
placed in an ice hold and regularly repacked to maintain a desired level of freshness over the 
course of many weeks out at sea, ice will melt and will have to be replaced by fresh ice from 
an ice maker.  Otherwise, there exists a trade-off between the fish quality and the trip length.   
 
III.  A REVENUE TARGET MODEL IN FISHERY 
 
Our primary interest is seeing how having a target revenue goal impacts trip length.  
Decisions on trip length are made one trip at a time rather than over an entire lifecycle.  
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Hence, our model is based on a single trip.  To incorporate revenue goal-setting, we assume 
that the captain’s preference takes the following form: 
1U(Y,d) (Y T) d                   (Y T)                                   
1
+γθ= α − − + γ ≺                           (1) 
1U(Y,d) (Y T) d                      (Y T)
1
+γθ= − − + γ ;                                                               (2) 
where U(Y,d) is the utility function under prospect theory and d is the number of fishing 
days.  Y is the fishing revenue for the trip, and Y=wd, where w is the average daily fish 
revenue. T is the reference (target) revenue level. α is a parameter representing how sensitive 
the captain is to deviation from the reference revenue.  We assume that α>1 reflects loss 
aversion.  θ is a parameter for the disutility of fishing effort (θ>0).  γ is the inverse elasticity 
parameter of revenue with respect to fishing days (γ>0).   
There are two elements in the utility function. The first element represents utility, 
which varies depending on how much the actual fishing revenue exceeds the target (Y-T). 
The second element is the standard disutility function. The utility function is kinked at Y=T.  
When the captain exceeds the target revenue level (Y>T), the marginal utility is 1, which 
implies that a revenue increase of $1 results in a 1 unit increase in utility.  When the captain 
has not exceeded the target revenue level (Y<T), the marginal utility is α,  which is greater 
than 1, which implies that a revenue increase of $1 leads to more than a 1 unit increase in 
utility.  In this case, the captain places more value on a $1 revenue increase because the 
captain has yet to reach the point where Y>T and, thus, is more willing to continue fishing.  
A productive fishing trip shortens the time in which the captain can achieve the target goal 
(i.e. Y>T), whereas an unproductive trip lengthens the time the captain has to achieve the 
target goal as there is incentive to fish longer as long as Y<T.   Intuitively, this depicts the 
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negative relationship between daily fishing revenue and trip length.  We will formally show 
under what circumstance this relationship will occur.               
 
Case 1: Y<T  
Substitute Y = wd into (1), we have: 
1U(d) (wd T) d                      
1
+γθ= α − − + γ                                                                          (3) 
Solving the first order condition (FOC) to optimize the captain’s utility, we have: 
1/
*
*U(d=d*) w* *0 w (d ) d
d
γ
γ ⎛ ⎞∂ α⎜ ⎟= ⇔α =θ ⇔ =⎜ ⎟∂ θ⎝ ⎠
                                                                  (4) 
To find the threshold values for w and d, we consider the case w*d* =Y*=T*. Substituting 
1/*wd*
γ⎛ ⎞α= ⎜ ⎟θ⎝ ⎠
from (4) and solving for d* and w* we have: 
1/wd*                                                       
γα⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟θ⎝ ⎠                                                            (5) 
1
1 1w* T                                             
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞γ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+γ⎝ ⎠ +γ⎝ ⎠θ⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟α⎝ ⎠                                                                (6) 
Case 2: Y>T 
In this case, α=1. Follow the same procedure as Case 1.  By substituting α=1 into (5) and (6), 
we have: 
1/**
** wd                                                                   
γ⎛ ⎞=⎜ ⎟θ⎝ ⎠
                                                             (7) 
1
1 1w ** T                                                                 
γ
+γ +γ= θ                                                   (8) 
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Using equations (5) to (8), we can show that the optimal number of fishing days doptimal can 
be one of the following: 
 w<w* then  
1/⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
optimal wd
γα
θ                                                                                              (9) 
 w>w** then 
1/⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
optimal wd
γ
θ                                                                                              (10) 
 w*<w<w** then =optimal Td
w
                                                                                             (11) 
  where 
1
1 1w* T
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞γ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+γ⎝ ⎠ +γ⎝ ⎠θ⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟α⎝ ⎠  and 
1
1 1w ** T
γ
+γ +γ= θ , respectively. 
As such, there is a positive correlation between the optimal number of fishing days 
(doptimal) and the average daily fishing revenue (w) when w<w* or w>w** (eq. 9 &10). This 
positive correlation is in accordance with predictions from the standard inter-temporal model 
of labor supply.  In addition, there is a negative correlation between the number of fishing 
days and the daily fish revenue when w*<w<w** (eq. 11).  Thus, the revenue target model 
can address a broader range of impacts that daily revenue may have on the fishing trip length.  
Under the revenue target model, it is plausible that an increase in daily fishing revenue 
results in shorter trips.  The following section empirically explores how closely the revenue 
target model describes the behavior of Hawaii longline fishermen.  
 
 
 
IV. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF HAWAII BASED LONGLINE FISHERY 
 
 
Longline fishery in Hawaii can be characterized as a multi-species targeted fishery. The 
industry was first introduced by Japanese immigrants in early 1900s. For a relatively long 
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time, the fleet had included a small number of vessels with simple technology. Significant 
change happened in the late 1980s when there was a large number of high capital intensive 
vessels from the mainland entering Hawaii. The number of active vessels has also been on 
the rise. There are 135 active longline vessels at this moment. Table 1 presents basic 
characteristics of vessels surveyed in the 2004 Hawaii based longline technology survey. As 
can be seen from the table, Hawaii longline vessels vary greatly in most of the basic 
characteristics. Some vessels are very large and capital intensive, while others are small and 
more labor intensive. Some vessels were built around the 1940s; some were built just few 
years ago. Variations in vessels’ characteristics may result in large standard deviation of 
catch per trip and trip’s revenue. 
 
V. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
 
Data Source and Model Specifications 
 
 
Information on the number of fishing days by trip and trip revenue is obtained from 
2004 logbook data and 2004 auction data, respectively.  It is worth noting that the swordfish 
fishery had been closed in Hawaii for the previous two years and was re-opened in 2004 
under a “set cap” program. Given this special feature of Hawaii’s swordfish fishery, our data 
includes information on tuna fishery only. Hereafter, longline fishery refers to only the tuna 
fishery. The logbook is compiled by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA).  The auction data is collected by the Hawaii Division of Aquatic Resources 
(HDAR).  The logbook data contains information on the number of fishing days for every 
longline trip in 2004, and the auction data records the trip revenue for each longline vessel in 
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that same year.  These two datasets were combined for the estimation of the empirical model. 
It is worth noting that there are a number of limitations with the data that make it 
difficult to parse the underlying reason for the observed data patterns i.e., a lack of 
information on dockside prices or contractual shares. Thus, we are cautious when drawing 
inference from the associated results. 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the main variables. The average length of a 
fishing trip in the Hawaii longline fishery is about 19 days.  Variation of the number of 
fishing days is relatively large.  An average vessel earns about $32,000 per trip or $1,800 per 
fishing day.   
The standard deviations in fish revenues are relatively large, reflecting the diversity 
of vessel characteristics within the fisheries. About 50% of captains have 16 years of longline 
fishing.  In terms of the vessel’s capacity, about 35% of vessels have an ice maker.   
  
Model Specifications 
 
Given that the number of fishing days is count data one can use a generalized linear 
model such as a Poisson model3 to investigate the relationship between the number of fishing 
days and daily revenue.  In this study, we are more interested in the elasticity of fishing day 
with respect to daily revenue, thus we take the log of fishing days, in turn making the 
dependent variable continuous. We then use a standard linear model accordingly. Our 
approach is the same as those studies on the taxi drivers e.g., Camerer et al. (1997) and Chou 
(2002). To check the robustness of the results, we also run the Poisson model. As can be seen 
from Table 3, the finding indicates a more significant negative relationship between number 
of fishing days and daily revenue than other model specifications. 
                                                 
3 We thank a referee for mentioning this important point. 
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We then start with the basic empirical model, which takes the following form:   
 
                                                                                                                                                                  ln ln (12)= + +it it it itD W Xη β ε  
 
where itD  represents the number of fishing days by vessel  i on trip t, itW  is the average daily 
revenue of vessel i on trip t, Xit are the vessel’s characteristics that may impact the trip’s 
fishing length; εit is the standard error term.  Camerer et al. (1997) point out that this method 
of estimating itW  is very similar to that used in the labor supply literature, where wage rate is 
estimated by dividing yearly (monthly) income by yearly (monthly) working hours.  Thus, η  
is interpreted as the daily revenue elasticity. 
We include a binary variable indicating the presence of an ice maker as well the 
vessel’s length to proxy for the vessel’s capacity to stay longer in the ocean; hereafter we 
term it “staying power”.  To account for the high demand of fish during the holiday season, 
we use a binary variable to represent the holiday seasons on Thanksgiving and Christmas. 
In terms of model specification, ideally one can look at the daily revenue in a given 
trip.  This makes it possible to estimate the accumulated revenue at any given fishing day.  
The cumulative revenue is the deciding factor influencing whether the captain continues to 
fish or not.  However, we do not have information on daily revenue for each individual 
fishing trip, thus we use the average daily revenue as the dependent variable.  
The use of the average daily revenue may cause potential measurement error.  
Camerer et al. (1997) and Chou (2002) in their studies on taxi drivers mention that there may 
have been measurement errors in the recorded number of driving hours.  This problem is 
known as division bias in labor economics studies (Borjas, 1980).  Likewise, one may 
suspect potential measurement errors in the number of fishing days compiled in the logbook. 
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If such is the case, inflated records may increase the number of fishing days and deflate 
average trip revenue, while deflated records may decrease the number of fishing days and 
inflate average trip revenue.  Both cases of misreporting fishing days lead to spurious 
negative elasticity.  On the other hand, the daily revenue elasticity may be biased towards 
zero due to an over reporting of total trip revenue.  These two sources of bias will either 
reinforce or counteract each other, depending on whether the true daily revenue elasticity is 
positive or negative. Therefore, the net effect is uncertain; we show this result in the 
appendix.   
In the fisheries context, the logbook contains the record of the number of fishing days 
made by each vessel, as it is required by law for fishermen to complete their logs.  After 
every trip, NOAA collects the logbook directly from the captain and ensures that key 
information, such as fishing days, is recorded correctly. Thus, the data quality, particularly 
regarding fishing trip days, is quite accurate.  Potential measurement errors are more likely to 
come from the trip revenue data.  
Greene (2004) points out that measurement error in the dependent variable is less 
serious than in the independent variable. Accordingly, we will mainly focus on correcting 
potential measurement errors in the independent variable (i.e. the daily revenue). The 
corrections are made by finding an appropriate instrumental variable.  Given the data 
available, we use the average daily fish revenue of other vessels landing on the same day as 
the instrument for daily revenue.  In theory, a good instrument has the covariance of zero, or 
is unrelated to total fishing days, and has a strong correlation with the daily revenue of the 
concerned vessel. We believe that the chosen variable has minimal or no impact on the 
captain’s decision to adjust the trip length (dependent variable) and is not highly correlated 
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with the error terms in the trip length equation.  We have also found that the greater (lower) 
the daily revenue of other vessels, the higher (lower) the daily revenue of the concerned 
vessel since they face the same market conditions at the auction.  Understandably, this 
interpretation is made under the assumption that there is not much variation in the fishing 
conditions. 
Another practical consideration is whether the chosen instrument is strong. Cameron 
and Trivedi (2006) point out that the weak IV estimator may be markedly biased in finite 
samples even though it is asymptotically consistent.  To check whether or not the instrument 
variable is weak,  we use the Cragg-Donald Wald statistics, which is a F statistic in the first 
stage of the 2SLS model, and compare it with the Stock-Yoko (2005) critical values to check 
whether the instrumental variable is weak or not.  The Cragg-Donald Wald statistics of 21.75 
from our 2SLS model indicate a reasonably strong instrumental variable. 
We realize that the above chosen instrumental variable is not perfect in any way. That 
being said, we believe that it is the best instrumental variable (IV) we can have given the data 
at hand. Also, we present both models with and without the instrumental variables in all 
analyses to check whether the findings are consistent.   
 As a final comment in this section, note that our data has the underlying panel 
structure.  Following Stock and Watson (2006), we cluster standard errors (SEs) at the vessel 
level to have SEs that are robust to both heteroskedasticity and intra-group correlation. 
 
Main Empirical Results 
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Table 3 presents the results of the estimation from OLS, 2SLS and fixed effect with 
instrumental variable models. The key finding is that daily fishing revenue has a negative and 
significant impact on the number of fishing days in all models.  That is, the higher the daily 
revenue is, the shorter the fishing trip.  This finding is consistent with the taxi drivers studies 
by Camerer et al. (1997) and Chou (2002).  From Heath, Larrick, and Wu’s insights (1999), 
we can infer that fishermen seem more motivated to reach the revenue target rather than to 
surpass it. 
Consistent with what we show in the appendix, the absolute value of the estimated 
revenue elasticity for the 2SLS model is marginally greater than the OLS. This result implies 
that there may be marginal measurement error in the instrumental variable (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2006).   In comparison with the Camerer et al. (1997) and Chou (2002) studies, the 
elasticity of labor supply with respect to daily revenue in the fisheries is smaller in 
magnitude. The smaller elasticity may reflect that fishermen have less flexibility in choosing 
the length of a fishing trip due to the vessel capacity constraints. 
In addition to daily revenue, other variables also have significant and expected effects 
on the number of fishing days. The presence of an ice maker significantly increases the 
number of fishing days because it enables the vessel to preserve the fish quality longer. 
Likewise, bigger vessels, as indicated by having greater length, are capable of longer fishing 
trips.  From the estimations, we can also infer that trip length is significantly shorter during 
the holiday seasons.  One possible reason is that fishermen receive higher profits due to 
higher prices from the increased demand of fish during the holidays. Accordingly, there is an 
incentive to shorten the fishing trip, in exchange for increasing the number of fishing trips.  
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VI. ETHNICITY AND REVENUE TARGET MODEL 
 
A distinguishing feature of the Hawaii longline fisheries is the ethnic diversity of its 
vessel owners. Chou (2002) argues that Chinese cab drivers are more business savvy and 
thus are less likely to behave according to the revenue target model in comparison with other 
drivers.  We find in the context of the Hawaii longline fisheries that ethnicity plays a key role 
in the decision-making process for labor supply.  Vessels owners in the Hawaii fleet are one 
of three ethnicities: Caucasian, Korean, and Vietnamese.  Due to some cultural similarities, 
we have combined Korean and Vietnamese under “Asian.”. Ethnic backgrounds tell how 
vessel operators act in relation to the target revenue model. We expect that the integration of 
ethnicity into the empirical analysis of the target revenue model provides another perspective 
of decision-making behavior on labor supply. 
Table 4 presents related statistics of the vessel by ethnicity. We can see that Asian 
vessels fish longer (day per trip) than Caucasian boats, though the difference is negligible. 
Caucasian boats, however, appear more profitable than their Asian counterparts.   
As far as the regression analysis is concerned (Table 5), the only significant result in 
the 2SLS model is a negative impact of daily revenue on fishing length among Asian-owned 
vessels.  One possible reason for the insignificant result among Caucasian boats is due to 
reduced efficiency in the 2SLS model (increase in the standard errors).  In the OLS model, 
the revenue elasticity is negative and significant among both groups of vessels.   
The finding from the 2SLS model describes how ethnicity may impact the modeling 
of preferences.  Caucasian owners seem quicker to make optimal decisions regarding trip 
length as suggested by the standard model. They will find it advantageous to fish longer on a 
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productive trip or to fish shorter on an unproductive trip. 
 
VII.  CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS AND THE REVENUE TARGET MODEL 
 
Vessel captains face capacity constraints that prevent them from fishing past a certain 
amount of time, such as fuel and the preservation of fish quality. Therefore, the prediction of 
a positive revenue elasticity by the standard model of labor supply may not apply to fishing 
vessels because their capacity constraints are lower.  For instance, the captain might decide to 
return to the dock even in a good trip to preserve the fish’s freshness. To proxy for the 
dependence of vessels on capacity constraint, we use a “staying capacity” binary variable to 
indicate whether the vessel has an ice-maker and has a median or greater length4. Because of 
their less dependence on capacity constraints, high capacity vessels are more likely to behave 
according to the standard model of labor supply provided the standard model correctly 
describes Hawaii’s longline captains’ fishing behavior.  
Table 6 summarizes statistics of vessels by staying capacity. As expected, vessels 
with high staying capacity fish longer than low capacity vessels though the difference is 
insignificant.  High staying capacity vessels are also more profitable on a per trip and per day 
basis.   
To investigate the effect of capacity constraints on fishing behavior under the target 
revenue framework, we run the regression models by the vessels’ staying capacity (Table 7). 
The results suggest that both groups of vessels with high and low staying capacity seem to 
behave in accordance with the target revenue model. Also, the difference in daily revenue 
                                                 
4 We also use the vessel width and a combination of the vessel width and length as a proxy for its staying 
capacity. The results are basically the same. 
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elasticity among these two groups of vessels is not statistically significant by Wu-Hausman 
test (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). Put differently, Hawaii’s longline captains follow the 
same fishing behavior independent of vessel’s “staying capacity”.    
 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper we attempt to provide another perspective within the existing labor supply 
literature. We developed a simple target revenue model to show, under certain conditions, 
that increases in daily fishing revenue lead to decreases in trip length.  Using different model 
specifications, we found a significantly negative correlation between daily revenue and the 
trip length. The more productive their fishing trip is, the shorter the captains will choose to 
make their fishing trip. This finding implies that Hawaii fishermen tend to have a revenue 
target for their fishing trips. Our study, like Camerer et al. (1997), Chou (2002), and Fehr and 
Goette (2004, 2006), highlights the relevance of integrating prospect theory into the 
framework of labor economics.  
We also investigated how unique features of the fisheries impact fishermen’s 
behavior under the target revenue framework.  We separated the vessels into groups by their 
staying capacity.  We found that Hawaii’s longline captains follow the same fishing behavior 
independent of vessel’s “staying capacity”. We also found that Asian American vessel 
owners exhibit negative daily revenue elasticities, but Caucasian vessels owners seem to 
respond less negatively to increases in daily revenue.   
This paper can be improved in a number of aspects. The use of an imperfect 
instrumental variable may lead to less biased estimations at the expense of an efficiency loss. 
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In some estimations, the results from the 2SLS model became less significant than the OLS 
due to increase in the standard errors. An approach based on a system of structural equations 
and natural experiments may help solve this problem (Cameron and Trivedi, 2006). 
As a potential extension of the paper, we can conduct further field experiments with 
Hawaii longline fishermen to measure the loss aversion parameter for each participant and 
identify a model that best describes the agent’s risk behavior.  Fehr and Goette (2006) 
suggest either a reference dependence model or neoclassical model with non-separable 
preferences.  They also find that loss-averse participants are more likely to behave in 
accordance with the target model. Integrating the risk behavior of fishermen under prospect 
theory, of which loss aversion is an important aspect, into the framework of fisheries decision 
making is a promising area in fisheries research. 
Another potential extension of this study is to investigate how well the target model 
performs relative to the hazard model by Farber. In his study of taxi cab drivers, Farber 
(2005, 2008) finds the standard model more favorable than the target revenue model.  Our 
study of the Hawaii longline fisheries reveals that the target revenue model gives robust 
findings under different model specifications.  Accordingly, we believe that our results will 
probably hold under Farber’s approach.  That being said, the current study would be more 
complete if we could also use Farber’s approach to check the robustness of the results. 
However, we presently do not have information on the daily vessel revenue for a given 
fishing trip.  Improvement on logbook data collection will allow us to investigate the relative 
performance of the target revenue model against the standard model of labor supply.  
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 Finally, like Farber (2005, 2008) and  Crawford and Meng (2008), we take targets as 
givens rather than modeling them as endogenously determined. Further analysis on how 
these targets are formed and adjusted over time is a promising direction for future research.   
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APPENDIX 
 
PROOF OF AMBIGUOUS DIVISION BIAS IN OLS 
 
Consider an econometric model for fishing trip length: 
* *
                                                                                                                                                                       ln *ln A1= + +i i iD Wα β ε  
where iD  is the true number of fishing days for vessel i; iW  is the corresponding true daily 
revenue. By definition, iW   = iY / iD  where iW  is the trip revenue. 
 
Suppose, there is some measurement error in the number of fishing days and trip revenue, 
such that, * *i i  i ii iln D ln D  and ln W ln W= +η = + γ .  We are assuming that: 
Cov(ηi, εi)= Cov(γi, εi)=0 
Due to measurement errors, model (1) becomes: 
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ln *(ln ln ) A2
or equivalently,
ln *(ln ln )
−
+
= + − + − +
= + − + − +
i i i i i i i
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D Y D
η α β γ η ε
α β γ η η ε                                                                            
                                         
A3
Therefore, we end up estimating the following equation:
ln *(ln ) += + + − +i i i i i iD Wα β γ η η ε                                                                          
^ , ,
)
A4
Using OLS to estimate, we have:
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From A5, we can infer that: 
 i.  If ,cov( ) var( )<i i iη γ η  then ^plim <olsβ β , thus OLS gives negative bias.  
 ii. If ,cov( ) var( )>i i iη γ η , the effect of measurement errors on βOLS is ambiguous. 
 
As discussed, in the case of Hawaii, thanks to good quality on the number of fishing days, we 
can assume i 0η ≈ , therefore: 
^ var(ln )plim   <                                                                     A6
var(ln ) var( )
= +
i
ols
i i
W
W
β β βγ  
This is a classical case of measurement error where OLS’s estimate is attenuationly 
(decreasingly) bias toward zero. Accordingly, 2SLS with valid instrumental variable will 
give
^ ^
2SLS OLSβ > β .
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TABLE 1:  BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF HAWAII  LONGLINE VESSELS 
 
Vessel characteristics 
 
Mean Standard Deviation 
 
Current appraisal value ($) 
 
Catch per trip (pound) 
 
Revenue per trip ($) 
 
Age 
 
Length5 (ft) 
 
Average speed 
 
Captain/owner LL experience 
 
Number of crew 
 
Engine horsepower 
 
428,115 
 
12,468 
 
31,294 
 
22 
 
69 
 
7.3 
 
14 
 
5 
 
465 
 
241,000 
 
3,517 
 
8,832 
 
11 
 
11 
 
0.85 
 
9 
 
0.8 
 
202 
 
Source: Report on the 2004 Hawaii based longline fishery technology survey 
                                                 
5 Data is provided by the Coast Guard 
 32
 
TABLE 2: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
 Mean Median SD 
Total  (81 Vessels) 
# Fishing days 
 
Daily revenue ($) 
 
Trip revenue ($) 
 
Having Ice Maker (1: Yes, 2:No) 
 
Longline Fishing Experience (years) 
 
 
18.77 
 
1794 
 
32,225 
 
0.35 
 
17.13 
 
 
19.00 
 
1648 
 
31,033 
 
0 
 
16 
 
 
5.03 
 
871 
 
14,239 
 
0.47 
 
10.22 
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TABLE 3: ESTIMATED DAILY FISHING REVENUE ELASTICITY FROM OLS, 2SLS 
AND FIXED EFFECT WITH INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE MODELS 
  OLS 2SLS FE with 2SLS 
 Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE 
Log daily revenue -0.134*** 0.028 -0.211** 0.090 -0.164** 0.082
Holiday seasons -0.158*** 0.029 -0.147*** 0.031 -0.168*** 0.032
Fishing experience 0.015*** 0.005 0.015*** 0.005  
Having ice maker -0.025 0.026 0.081 0.051
Fishing experience squared -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000  
Education -0.053*** 0.019 -0.052*** 0.020  
Caucasian Captains -0.077** 0.030 -0.061* 0.035 0.021 0.046
Length 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.049*** 0.019
Width 0.014** 0.006 0.016** 0.007  
Constant 3.475*** 0.258 3.992*** 0.625  
Adjusted R squared 0.18 0.16 0.16 
  
 
 POISSON MODEL WITH NUMBER OF FISHING DAYS AS  A DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 
  Coefficient SE 
Daily revenue -0.046*** 0.009 
Holiday seasons -0.056*** 0.010 
Fishing experience 0.005*** 0.002 
Having ice maker -0.009 0.009 
Fishing experience squared -0.000*** 0.000 
Education -0.018*** 0.006 
Caucasian Captains -0.027** 0.010 
Length 0.001 0.001 
Width 0.005** 0.002 
Constant 1.258*** 0.088 
Number of observations 840  
Log pseudolikelihood  -1252  
      
 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
We conducted robust regression and adjusted standard errors for correlations within 
individuals. 
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 TABLE 4: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF VESSELS BY OWNER’S  ETHNICITY 
 
 Mean Median SD 
Caucasian Owner  
 
# Fishing days 
 
Daily revenue ($) 
 
Trip revenue ($) 
 
 
Asian Owner  
 
# Fishing days 
 
Daily revenue ($) 
 
Trip revenue ($) 
 
 
18.40 
 
1910 
 
33828 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
1715 
 
31124 
 
 
 
18 
 
1798 
 
32502 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
1590 
 
30136 
 
 
 
4.43 
 
909 
 
15292 
 
 
 
 
5.39 
 
835 
 
13108 
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TABLE 5: ESTIMATED DAILY FISHING REVENUE ELASTICITY BY VESSEL 
OWNER’S ETHNICITY ESTIMATED BY OLS & 2SLS 
             OLS        2SLS   
 Asian Caucasian Asian Caucasian 
Log daily revenue -0.124*** -0.153*** -0.267** -0.120
Holiday seasons -0.208*** -0.076** -0.188*** -0.082*
Longline fishing experience 0.014*** 0.013** 0.017*** 0.013**
Longline fishing experience square -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000**
Having ice maker -0.066* -0.012 -0.053 -0.012
Education -0.043** -0.116** -0.039* -0.115**
Length 0.005* 0.002 0.005* 0.002
Width 0.010 0.013 0.013 0.012
Constant 3.372*** 3.687*** 4.272*** 3.460***
Number of obs 479 361 479 361
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.23 0.13 0.23
 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
We conducted robust regression and adjusted standard errors for correlations within 
individuals. 
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TABLE 6: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF VESSELS BY STAYING CAPACITY 
 
 Mean Median SD 
Low staying capacity  
 
# Fishing days 
 
Daily revenue ($) 
 
Trip revenue ($) 
 
High staying capacity  
 
# Fishing days 
 
Daily revenue ($) 
 
Trip revenue ($) 
 
 
18.68 
 
1724 
 
30881 
 
 
 
19.03 
 
1988 
 
35878 
 
 
19 
 
1603 
 
29877 
 
 
 
19 
 
1820 
 
34449 
 
 
4.85 
 
838 
 
13616 
 
 
 
5.47 
 
929 
 
15243 
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TABLE 7: ESTIMATED DAILY FISHING REVENUE ELASTICITY BY VESSEL’S 
“STAYING CAPACITY” USING OLS AND 2SLS MODELS 
           OLS        2SLS   
 High capacity Low 
capacity 
High 
capacity 
Low 
capacity 
Log daily revenue -0.203*** -0.101*** -0.200* -0.232*
Holiday seasons -0.161*** -0.156*** -0.161*** -0.138***
Fishing experience 0.006 0.017*** 0.006 0.018***
Fishing experience squared -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000***
Education -0.031 -0.063** -0.031 -0.060**
Caucasian Captains -0.088*** -0.072** -0.089*** -0.048
Width 0.026*** 0.023*** 0.026*** 0.026***
Constant 3.879*** 3.226*** 3.861*** 4.097***
Number of obs 243 597 243 597
Adjusted R2 0.24 0.18 0.24 0.12
    
      
  
   
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
We conducted robust regression and adjusted standard errors for correlations within 
individuals. 
